On Reality

What is the nature of reality? This is merely one question that science attempts to answer; but how can we be certain that such a thing as an objective reality even exists?

Scientific realism holds that science aims to describe the genuine structure of the world in which we live; that the world is very much existing all around us, completely unconcerned with our thoughts or feelings about it. Language and understanding has no bearing on the existence of an objective reality. That is not to say that there are not subjective aspects of reality; but there is a higher, fundamental reality that we all inhabit in common, which exists independently of our individual interpretations of it.

Philosopher Bas van Fraassen argues that expressing the scientific realist point of view in such a way that is dependent upon the precision of current scientific theories is erroneous. Like Popper before him, he acknowledges the potential for a given theory to fall under the weight of falsifiability. If one’s entire premise of scientific realism rests upon the existence of the currently recognized scientific paradigms, if—and arguably when—those paradigms shift, the scientific realist must reconsider their position due to its crumbling foundation.

A better approach to scientific realism seems to be a common-sense version of it, rooted in naturalism. This naturalized form of common-sense realism holds that “we all inhabit a common reality which has a structure that exists independently of what people think and say about it, except insofar as reality is comprised of thought, theories, and other symbols, and except insofar as reality is dependent on thoughts, theories, and other symbols in ways that might be uncovered by science.” This really seems to cover all the bases, so to speak.

Finally, scientific realism can be divided into two ideologies: optimism and pessimism. The optimistic scientific realist believes we can be confident that science is accomplishing the discovery of the basic structure of reality; whereas the pessimistic scientific realist believes in the tendency toward evidentiary confusion and the utter fallibility of the human mind. The optimist essentially flies in the face of Popper and his propensity to never have full confidence in a theory; the pessimist, if taken too far, can border upon being incompatible with scientific realism entirely.

Personally, my inclination is toward a weak scientific realism with a slightly pessimistic bent. I believe in Popper’s notion that we should never be too married to our theories; and it is clear to me that there is an objective reality that is not affected in any way by an observer’s thoughts, feelings or words—but also, that in the long run, this matters very little. Bas van Fraassen’s assertion that what matters is the empirical adequacy of our theories as representations of the way the real world works resonates with me. Paradigms shift, and along with them, our perception of reality—but reality itself is a constant.